Fred Hiatt Spins

For those of you who don't regularly read Duncan Black's indispensable Philly-based blog, you should know that Atrios regularly criticizes Washington Post Editorial Fred Hiatt for any number of journalistic sins.

I am sure he'd have a field day with today's editorial.

As I've just declared it's Pittsburgh for Philadelphia--Primanti's for Geno's--Steelers for Eagles day here at 2PJ, I'll have a go at the editorial.

Fred writes about the "Phase II" report out o the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Hiatt finds less there than meets the eye (or at least he shows us all what he thinks is enough for us to believe that there's less there than meets the eye).

For example he writes:

But dive into Rockefeller's report, in search of where exactly President Bush lied about what his intelligence agencies were telling him about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and you may be surprised by what you find.

On Iraq's nuclear weapons program? The president's statements "were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates."

That's from page 15. What Hiatt leaves out tells you what the lie was. Here's the complete sentence:

Conclusion I: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community.[emphasis added]

And what were some of those statements? On October 7, 2002 President Bush said this (page 5 of the report):

The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists...Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

On page 8 we can read this:

In April 2001, the CIA noted that Iraq's attempts to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a reconstitution effort might be underway.

And a few sentence later:

The Defense Intelligence Agency produced several similar assessments in 2002, noting in a May 2002 report that "Although there is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort, we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items, key personnel assigned to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, and Saddam's interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Saddam has not abandoned the nuclear weapon program.

What follows immediately is the part that was left out of Hiatt's spin:

The Department of Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CIA's conclusions regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended for a different use, such as a conventional rocket program. Based on other evidence, including Saddam's meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and possible attempts to procure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Saddam Hussein might be attempting to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program, but suggested that the evidence was not conclusive.

And then thre's this:

The Department of State's Bureay of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes.

And so on. Here's the rest of the Conclusion I paragraph:

Prior to October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department's Bureay of Intelligence and Research, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program.

What Hiatt spins out of his discourse is the fact that the administration failed to mention any dissent from the story they wanted to make sure we all believed. Even if there was evidence supporting what they said, the fact that they hid the evidence that didn't is enough for us to say, without any doubt: THEY LIED.

And people died.