Which triggered this analysis from Josh Marshall:The U.S. military's claim that violence has decreased sharply in Iraq in recent months has come under scrutiny from many experts within and outside the government, who contend that some of the underlying statistics are questionable and selectively ignore negative trends.
Reductions in violence form the centerpiece of the Bush administration's claim that its war strategy is working. In congressional testimony Monday, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, is expected to cite a 75 percent decrease in sectarian attacks. According to senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad, overall attacks in Iraq were down to 960 a week in August, compared with 1,700 a week in June, and civilian casualties had fallen 17 percent between December 2006 and last month. Unofficial Iraqi figures show a similar decrease.
Others who have looked at the full range of U.S. government statistics on violence, however, accuse the military of cherry-picking positive indicators and caution that the numbers -- most of which are classified -- are often confusing and contradictory. "Let's just say that there are several different sources within the administration on violence, and those sources do not agree," Comptroller General David Walker told Congress on Tuesday in releasing a new Government Accountability Office report on Iraq.
Senior U.S. officers in Baghdad disputed the accuracy and conclusions of the largely negative GAO report, which they said had adopted a flawed counting methodology used by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Many of those conclusions were also reflected in last month's pessimistic National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.
DeYoung's article gives us a couple bits of information that help us start to unravel the mystery. First, the military command in Baghdad is in a spat with the GAO, which the generals accuse of using a flawed methodology. (GAO's analysis basically disagreed with them on all particulars.) DeYoung's piece includes the very telling detail that the GAO is using the same methodology that the CIA and the DIA favor. So it would seem that it's not only a question of the government versus outside observers. The military command in Baghdad sounds like it's completely isolated even within the US government on how to compute the numbers.More recently, Marshall pointed out that Petraeus' methology itself is classified:
Much like the "proof" that Saddam actually had WMD just before the invasion. That he somehow (by truck convoy or plane - the story keeps shifting) got them safely tucked away in the Bekaa valley in Syria. Jack Kelly had a whole column on it February, 2006 where he ends things with a tart:In other words, it's not just a matter of getting the numbers from Petraeus and his staff and deciding whether you believe them or not. They won't even tell us what the numbers are -- let alone how they came up with them. All they'll say is that they're very good. Or in some cases that there's X percentage drop over the course of the surge. Or an isolated number here or there.
But actual hard numbers? Going back over the last couple years? For some reason we're not allowed to see those.
Perhaps Petraeus and Crocker will sit down tomorrow and share all this data as part of their presentation. But if not, this is the issue. What possible security need is served by keeping this data secret? And with all we've been through, can anyone believe that if the numbers were solid that we'd wouldn't be being buried in data right now? [emphasis added]
Those who have bet their political futures that Saddam had no WMD may be starting to sweat.If it's true and the primary cause of dubya's war was verified, then we certainly would have been hearing about it from all levels of the administration.
Since we didn't, it's safe to assume the whole Bekaa Valley story is crap.
And since we're not hearing solid numbers heading up to Petraeus' speaking to Congress, Josh Marshall is probably right, something's wrong.
And meanwhile the number of dead continue to rise.
Bob Schieffer's commentary is a good place to end.
I wonder if any member of Congress will be asking Gen Petraeus whether dubya's war is worth the cost in lives and money.For months now, the administration has been telling us, let's wait until we hear from General Petraeus before we decide where to go next in Iraq.
Well, tomorrow we hear.
The atmosphere is much like the time during the Vietnam War, when the commander then, General William Westmoreland, was brought home to answer the question: Are we winning?
He assured us we were, and the government offered a blizzard of statistics to back him up. They weren't wrong. They were just irrelevant.
All we really learned then is that we were asking the wrong question. When we have to ask, "are we winning?" we're probably losing. Victory is always obvious.
The right question would have been: Is it worth the cost?
America eventually concluded it was not, and we left the war.
Let me preempt that question to General Petraeus. We haven't lost this war, but we're not winning it. We're hanging on. Victory would be obvious. Iraqi families would be strolling the streets of Baghdad, and Osama bin Laden would be walking out of a cave somewhere with his hands up.
Instead of that question, let's hope the general will be asked what we so often forgot during Vietnam: Is this worth the cost in lives and money?
And here's a follow-up: When the Iraqi parliament went on vacation during August, I gave up on trying to help them find a way to have an effective government. They have to do that. What we need to know now is whether keeping a large American military force in Iraq is the best way to make America safer.
To me, that's the real question.
